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INTRODUCTION
Almost ten years ago, the American Bar Association, in its Final
Report on Judicial Education on International Law, stated that:
the applicability of international legal norms in specific cases may
be, and frequently is, limited by the considerations of jurisdiction,
equity and due process that bear upon all proceedings before U.S.
courts. A decent respect for the opinions of mankind, however, as
well as for our own judicial traditions, demands that such
considerations not be invoked merely to disguise an unwillingness
to accord international legal norms their rightful place in our legal
1
system.

The above quote is telling for several reasons. Although it alludes
to the reluctance of U.S. courts to apply international law, it also
acknowledges a nexus between our nation’s own judicial traditions
2
and the “opinions of mankind.”
Federal courts have ruled throughout their history that
3
international law is an integral part of the domestic legal system.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court appears reticent to integrate

1. Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section of International
Law of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24 INT’L L. 903, 914-15 (Fall 1990)
[hereinafter ABA Final Report].
2. See id. at 908; see also Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1999). Bradley describes the broadening scope of
international law and how this area of law now regulates what was formerly regulated
only by domestic law. See id. Professor Henkin also discusses the related issue of
changes in international treaty commitments. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and
State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 36 (1996). He states that, “[h]uman
rights law has shaken the sources of international law, reshaped its character,
enlarged its domain . . . . Human rights law has been established largely by
treaty . . . .” Id. For a historical account of the development of international law, see
LOUIS HENKIN, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-31 (1981), and Louis B. Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982)
(discussing the history of international law concerning human rights).
3. See The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains . . . .”); see also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32
(1982) (citing The Charming Betsy for the rule of statutory construction, which
requires that courts construe legislation to avoid violating international law). Cf. Sale
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 178 n.35 (1993) (stating that under
Article Six of the Constitution a treaty is considered the supreme law of the land);
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886) (“The treaty of 1842 is,
therefore, the supreme law of the land, which the courts are bound to take judicial
notice of, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons
growing out of that treaty . . . .”); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796)
(stating that a treaty is the supreme law of land).
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Justice
international law without implementing legislation.
Blackmun articulated this sentiment when he said, “at best, the
present Supreme Court enforces some principles of international law
5
and some of its obligations some of the time.”
The implementing legislation, referred to above, has codified
international law and human rights standards—examples include the
6
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the Alien Tort
7
Claims Act (ATCA), and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
8
9
(TVPA).
In addition, customary international law, and more

4. See Gordon A. Christenson, Customary International Human Rights Law in
Domestic Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 225 (1996) (stating that
whether there is implementing legislation or not, United States courts deeply resist
“incorporating” developing international customary human rights law). Cf. M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1171 (1993) (noting
that “[t]here is substance to claims that a double standard exists between U.S.
policies and U.S. practices concerning human rights”).
5. Harry Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSL., Mar.-May 1994, at 8; see
also Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49
(1994) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)). Justice
Blackmun dissented in several prominent cases in an attempt to uphold principles of
international law. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 681
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting and joined by Blackmun, J.) (“When done without
consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a foreign country is a
gross violation of international law and gross disrespect for a norm high in the
opinion of mankind.” (quoting Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
Mankind, 25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 231 (1992) (footnote omitted))); Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting and joined by
Blackmun, J.) (“In addition to national laws, three leading human rights treaties
ratified or signed by the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.
Within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile crimes
appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved.” (footnote omitted)).
6. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (1998) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2242(a)) (implementing Article Three of the Convention Against Torture).
Section 2242 discusses the policy of the United States that protects against returning
persons to a country when there are “substantial grounds” to believe that the person
will be subjected to torture. See id.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). This Act allows an alien within U.S. borders to
bring a tort claim against a person alleged to have perpetrated torture “under color
of official authority.” Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
Note that the Filartiga decision preceded the ATCA; however, it recognizes the role
of domestic courts in punishing human rights abusers, such as perpetrators of
torture.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350(a)(2) (1994). Section 2(a)(1) allows victims who were in
the custody or physical control of state actors to bring tort claims in domestic courts
against perpetrators of torture.
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (“Customary international law
results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation.”). The Restatement further notes that “[t]he customary law of
human rights is part of the law of the United States to be applied as such by State as
well as Federal courts.” See id. § 702 cmt. c. But see M.O. Chibundu, Making
Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39
VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1078-79 (1999) (listing three potentially disabling ailments of
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specifically the doctrine of jus cogens, forms a potential basis upon
11
which domestic courts may find a violation of human rights. The
proliferation of international human rights doctrines, however, has
not signaled a commensurate increase in domestic remedies for
claims based solely on international human rights law that is not
12
codified in legislation.
International law, in various forms, has been a part of United States
13
history at least since the eighteenth century. Chief Justice Marshall
stated that, in the absence of congressional acts, United States courts
are “bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the
14
15
land.” The famous Paquete Habana decision, in which the Supreme
16
Court determined that courts must administer customary law,
echoed these earlier declarations of the importance of international

customary international law: (1) there is no authoritative text that can be used as a
reference, (2) competency of “law-givers” varies and there is a lack of hierarchy, and
(3) compliance and enforcement is problematic).
10. The Vienna Convention defines jus cogens as a “peremptory norm of general
international law” that is “accepted and recognized by the international community”
and from which derogation is not permitted. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. This peremptory norm may
only be modified if replaced by a more recent norm of general international law that
is similar in “character.” See id. See also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application
of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT’L L.
332, 350-51 (1988), for the proposition that jus cogens “embraces customary laws
considered binding on all nations”).
11. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 233
(2d ed. 1996) (stating that nation-states increasingly enforce international norms
and punish violations in domestic courts). Henkin goes on to state that international
law is law of the United States and is law for domestic governance. See id. at 236; see
also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1557 (1984) (arguing that although Congress has never declared that international
law is self-executing domestic law, both federal and state courts have applied
customary international law to cases without expressed legislative action).
12. See Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 405, 428 (1996-97) (“Very little, if any, ‘new’ international
human rights law has been incorporated in decisions by federal judges without the
aid of a statute, despite a tradition in which customary international law is part of
U.S. law and treaties are the supreme law of the land.”).
13. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of the Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952) (“It is an ancient and a salutary feature
of the Anglo-American legal tradition that the Law of Nations is a part of the law of
the land . . . .”). Numerous decisions have applied uncodified international law
within congressional acts. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199 (1796). For a discussion of the ways in which international law is a part of
United States legal history, see infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
14. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).
15. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
16. See id. at 700 (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).
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law in the American legal system. The right to bring a claim rooted
18
in some form of international law, is, therefore, supported by
19
history and threatens to disrupt only the illusory separation between
20
the laws of the United States and the law of nations.
In international law, human rights treaties pose a particular
challenge to advocates who wish to argue a claim in U.S. federal
21
courts. To raise a claim invoking a human rights treaty requires a
skilled navigation of both international law and the domestic legal
22
system. The obstacles one must face become even greater when the

17. See supra note 13.
18. See Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal
Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 399 (1997) (arguing that Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), “paved the way for the proper understanding of
international law as federal common law.”). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870-71 (1997) (concluding that without
implementing authorization, federal courts do not have jurisdiction based on
international law); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1664 (1997) (explaining the revisionist view of the federal common
law of foreign relations and arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations
practiced by courts and analyzed by scholars lacks justification in constitutional
history).
19. See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824, 1824-27 (1998). Professor Koh argues that international law is federal law.
See id. at 1824. He refutes the “revisionist” challenge, espoused by Professors Curtis
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, to the status of international law in U.S. courts. See id.
at 1827.
Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the importance of customary
international law in the American legal system is a modern phenomenon that is not
supported by history and departs from understood notions of federal common law,
federalism and the separation of powers. See id. at 1826. Other scholars also refute
the “revisionist” position of Bradley and Goldsmith. See Stephens, supra note 18, at
395-97 (arguing that Bradley and Goldsmith’s view is simplistic and overlooks the
complex history of international law in the American legal system). See generally
Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the
United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 306-21 (1999) (describing the “BradleyGoldsmith Errors and Fallacies”).
20. See Susan L. Karamanian, New Challenges for the American Lawyer in International
Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 757, 762-63 (1998) (explaining that “[f]ederal
courts frequently cite both the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration in
defining the law of nations”); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 102(1)(a),(b),(c)
and cmt. h (discussing customary law).
21. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 12 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999)
(noting that most human rights treaties require incorporation of obligations into
domestic law with corresponding remedies).
22. The goal of an advocate arguing in a domestic court, regardless of whether a
case is steeped in domestic or international law, should be to maintain the integrity
of the United States’ rules of law, equity, and the values of our country’s founders.
See Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27 AKRON L. REV.
281, 294 (1994) (discussing, in part, the tactics an advocate uses to urge the courts’
judicial enforcement of fundamental human rights). Judge Re’s response when
asked if domestic courts should enforce international human rights was: “I am
conservative only in the sense that I believe in (1) preserving those values that have
made this the great nation that it is, and (2) giving reality to all the values set forth in
our founding documents; some of them have not yet been attained. In addition, my
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23

treaty operates without implementing legislation.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
24
(“ICCPR”) is an example of international human rights treaty law
that is not supported by implementing legislation in the United
25
States. Unlike other treaties that are bilateral agreements between
sovereign nations, the ICCPR purports to regulate a government’s
treatment of both its own citizens as well as foreign nationals within
26
its jurisdiction.
This Comment is a primer that presents a step-by-step analysis for
raising a claim based on the ICCPR framework in U.S. domestic
courts. Using Article Six of the ICCPR, which prohibits the execution
27
of juveniles, this Comment discusses the methodology and process
through which the ICCPR may be raised as a defense to a
government action that is in violation of the treaty.
Part I of this Comment examines the interaction between the
death penalty and Article Six of the ICCPR. Part II analyzes the
arguments surrounding the self-executing nature of the ICCPR. Part
III discusses the United States’ expressed reservation to Article Six
and arguments designed to refute this obstacle. Finally, Part IV
discusses the domestic ramifications of Article Six on federalism and
the separation of powers doctrine.

love is not really contracts. My love is equity . . . .” Id. (citing Panel Discussion,
International Human Rights in American Courts: The Case of Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, in 86
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 324, 325 (1992) (statement of Judge Re)). Judge Re’s point
is that domestic enforcement of international humanitarian law is neither the
product of liberalism nor conservatism. Rather, the practice is firmly routed in the
country’s judicial history. One advocate arguing before Judge Re implied that the
formidable task of an international human rights advocate is to firmly ground the
case at hand “in the exact rule of law so that the other side would look like . . .
radicals.” See id. at 293.
23. See Bilder, supra note 21, at 12 (“The easiest and most effective way to
implement human rights is through action within each country’s own legal system. If
domestic law provides an effective system of remedies for violations of international
human rights obligations . . . the authority of a nation’s own legal system can be
mobilized to support compliance with international norms.”); see also Joan
Fitzpatrick, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 249 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed.
1999) (noting that direct enforcement of human rights treaties against violators that
are U.S. officials is an undeveloped area of law in United States).
24. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Sept. 8, 1992, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
25. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 249-50 (stating that the ICCPR is “non-selfexecuting” which means that its terms require further legislation to become
enforceable). But see discussion infra Part II (arguing that ICCPR is self-executing for
purposes of raising a defense).
26. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 (expressing
obligations of each State Party to individuals within its own jurisdiction).
27. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
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THE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES AND ARTICLE SIX OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
A. Overview of Death Penalty

The ICCPR came into force in the United States on September 8,
28
29
1992. Between 1966, the year the ICCPR was opened for signature,
30
and 1992, when the United States ratified it, debates within the
Senate and Executive Administrations indicated that the domestic
31
application of the ICCPR was precarious at best. Most confounding
was the United States’ supposed commitment to human rights and, at
the same time, its reluctance to implement the treaty in domestic
32
law.
Not surprisingly, the United States ratified the treaty with
33
Eleven
several reservations, declarations and understandings.
parties objected to the United States’ reservations, claiming that they
were invalid because they conflicted with the ICCPR’s object and
34
purpose.
Article Six, paragraph five of the ICCPR states that the “[s]entence
of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
35
women.” The U.S. Senate, however, has declared a reservation to
the above article, which states, “the United States reserves the right,

28. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY
GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DEC. 1999, at 134, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/18 (Vol. I)
(1999) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT]. On June 8, 1992, the United States deposited
its ratification with the United Nations. See id. at 139.
29. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the ICCPR on December 19,
1966. See ICCPR, supra note 24, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171. On October 5, 1977, President
Carter signed the ICCPR. See S. EXEC. DOC. NO. C, D, E, and F, at III-IV (1978).
President Carter submitted the ICCPR to the Senate for advice and consent on
February 23, 1978. See id. At that time, President Carter proposed a set of conditions
that included the reservation to Article 6(5). See id. at XII. In 1979, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the ICCPR, but did not make any
recommendations to the full Senate. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 2 (1992). On
August 8, 1991, President Bush again ignited interest in the ICCPR and proposed
that the Senate reconsider providing its advice and consent to the ICCPR. See id.
Additionally, President Bush proposed reservations and declarations similar to
President Carter’s. See id.
30. Finally, the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the
ICCPR on April 2, 1992. See 138 CONG. REC. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
31. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 1170-72 (tracing political arguments for and
against ratification of ICCPR).
32. See STATUS REPORT, supra note 28, at 143-44 (listing reservations,
understandings, and declarations); see also Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 1170-72 (noting
history of the reservation, declarations and understandings, which accompanied the
United States’ ratification of the ICCPR).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 144-48 (listing Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden).
35. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
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subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment
on any person . . . including such punishment for crimes committed
36
by persons below eighteen years of age.”
Domestic discussions of the juvenile death penalty have ebbed and
37
waned over the years. Domingues v. Nevada is the most recent in a
38
line of cases challenging the death penalty for juveniles. In this
case, Michael Domingues, then sixteen years-old, murdered a woman
39
and her four-year-old son. The trial court found Domingues guilty
of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon, and subsequently,
40
sentenced him to death. Domingues, in a motion for correction of
an illegal sentence, argued that the execution of juveniles violates
41
both customary international law as well as Article Six of the ICCPR.
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that because the United States
Senate ratified the ICCPR with an express reservation to Article Six,
this provision of the treaty does not supercede a state law allowing the
42
execution of juveniles.
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently
43
denied Domingues’s certiorari request.
The application of the death penalty raises many of the most
44
contentious issues in U.S. legal history. The periodic evaluation of

36. STATUS REPORT, supra note 28, reservation (2), at 143. The meaning and
validity of the Senate’s reservation is not uncontested and will be addressed in Part
III.
37. 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999). For an analysis
of the respondent’s and petitioner’s arguments in this case, see Connie de la Vega &
Jennifer Fiore, Sixteenth Annual International Law Symposium “Rights of Children in the
New Millennium”: The Supreme Court of the United States Has Been Called Upon to
Determine the Legality of the Juvenile Death Penalty in Michael Domingues v. State of Nev.,
21 WHITTIER L. REV. 215 (1999) (discussing the Domingues case and its relation to the
ICCPR).
38. See infra note 48 (examining additional cases challenging the application of
the death penalty toward juveniles).
39. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279.
40. See id. The court also found Domingues guilty of burglary, robbery with the
use of a deadly weapon, and first degree murder. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1280; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.025 (1997) (stating that the
death sentence shall not be imposed on persons convicted of a crime under the age
of sixteen).
43. See Domingues v. Nev., 528 U.S. 963 (1999).
44. Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government have statutes
authorizing the death penalty for certain types of murder; of these jurisdictions:
“sixteen (40%) have expressly chosen age eighteen at the time of the crime as the
minimum age for eligibility for that ultimate punishment. Another five (13%) have
chosen 17 as the minimum. The other nineteen (47%) of the death penalty
jurisdictions use age sixteen as the minimum age, either through an express age in
the statute (seven states) or by court ruling (twelve states).” VICTOR STREIB, THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILES
CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973 TO DECEMBER 30, 2000, at 5 (2001), at
http:www.law.onu.edu/faculty/Streib/juvdeath.htm (last modified Feb. 2001).
Professor Connie de la Vega has researched and written extensively on the subject of
the juvenile death penalty in the United States. See Connie de la Vega & Jennifer
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what is cruel and unusual punishment suggests that this is an area of
law constantly in a state of flux due to the naturally “evolving
45
standards” of decency. This fact, coupled with an overwhelmingly
low application of the death penalty for juvenile offenders
46
worldwide, indicates that the execution of minors will be challenged
under any law that forces the United States to comply with changing
values.
Within the United States, executing minors had thus far concerned
47
constitutional violations under the Eighth Amendment. The Court
48
in Domingues relied on Stanford v. Kentucky for support that the death
49
The Stanford decision recognized the
penalty is constitutional.
differentiation between constitutional analysis under the Eighth
Amendment and analysis under international agreements and
standards of decency that rebuke the use of the death penalty for
50
minors. The Domingues court, however, uses the Stanford decision as

Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death
Penalty?, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 735, 735-50 (1998).
45. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (noting that the Court has
interpreted the evolving standards of decency in a flexible manner, taking into
account contemporary attitudes of the country); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (noting that the Court cannot precisely define the bounds of the Eighth
Amendment, but the “[a]mendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”).
46. See STREIB, supra note 44, at 7 (noting the most recent documented
application of the death penalty in a foreign country was in Yemen on July 21, 1993).
Justice Springer, in his dissenting opinion in Domingues, noted that when the United
States executes juveniles, it joins hands with countries such as Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh,
Nigeria, and Pakistan. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1281.
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
48. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that Kentucky could execute a seventeenyear-old convicted of murder without violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment). The Supreme Court has decided several
other cases regarding the execution of juveniles. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 829, 838 (1988) (holding that a fifteen-year-old’s death sentence should be
set aside due to lack of national consensus approving execution of minors below
sixteen); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (determining that youth
must be considered as mitigating factor in applying the death penalty). Note that
the Court in Eddings did not rule directly on whether the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment under the United States Constitution. Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, stated that “[b]ecause we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v.
Ohio, we do not reach the conclusion of whether—in light of contemporary
standards—the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16
at the time of the offense.” Id. at 110 n.5. The decision in Thompson staying the
execution of a fifteen-year-old marked an expansion of Eddings, and for practical
purposes made it unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on children below
sixteen. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
49. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279 (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370).
50. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 (relying on American conceptions of decency
and rejecting a reliance on sentencing practices of foreign nations). The Stanford
Court narrowly interpreted evolving standards of decency, believing that even
though the practices of other democracies may be relevant, they are not dispositive
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evidence that the death penalty, when applied to minors, withstands
51
constitutional scrutiny and complies with treaty obligations. The
Domingues court’s reasoning is partly flawed, however, because it
conflates the issues of constitutionality and international treaty
52
obligations.
Assessing the constitutionality of executing minors
requires a separate analysis from that which is aimed at determining
whether Article Six of the ICCPR supercedes a Nevada criminal
sentencing statute. Even though provisions in the ICCPR may not
53
conflict with the U.S. Constitution, nothing in either the
Constitution or judicial precedent prevents the treaty from providing
54
additional protections to individuals.
Justice Springer, in his dissent in Domingues, noted that the United
States’ rebuke of international objections to the execution of minors
place it in the same category as countries notorious for human rights

in the absence of uniform practice within the United States. See id. See also Michael J.
Spillane, Comment, The Execution of Juvenile Offenders: Constitutional and International
Law Objections, 60 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 113, 116 (1991) (presenting an overview of the
execution of juvenile offenders between 1985 and the date of publication, 1991). As
of 1991, twenty-four states had statutes allowing the execution of juveniles seventeen
years of age, and twenty-one states allowed executions of those sixteen or older. See
id. at 117-18. The Stanford Court found convincing the lack of a national consensus
toward the execution of minors. It stated that “[o]f the 37 states whose laws permit
capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12
decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders.” Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370. The dissent
responded to the issue of consensus by stating that simply because a state’s statute
permits the execution of juveniles, does not imply that a legislature has taken a
moral stand on this issue. See id. at 385. In other words, an overwhelming majority of
the states could find the execution of juveniles to be morally reprehensible, yet
continue to maintain statutes that permit such executions.
51. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280 (explaining that “many” jurisdictions have
laws allowing the application of the death penalty to minors and citing Stanford as
evidence that such laws are constitutional).
52. See id. (discussing the Senate’s reservation to the ICCPR as if it is directly
related to the constitutional scrutiny afforded protections under the Eighth
Amendment). This discussion implies that the constitutionality of executing minors
under the Eighth Amendment lends support to the reservation’s validity. See id. The
two analyses are, however, separate and neither has a direct bearing on the other.
53. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (“There is nothing in [the] language
[of Article VI] intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have
to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.”); see also STATUS REPORT, supra
note 28, declaration (2), at 144. The ICCPR states in relevant part, “The United
States declares that it will continue to adhere to the requirements and constraints of
its Constitution in respect to all such restrictions and limitations.” Id.
54. Adding protections beyond what the federal Constitution already affords is
not an unfamiliar concept in the U.S. legal system. State governments have always
been free to provide enhanced protection of constitutional rights through their state
constitutions. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495-98 (1977) (explaining that state
governments are permitted to add individual rights through their constitutions but
may not lessen the rights afforded by the federal Constitution). The concept of
adding more human rights, provided they do not infringe on rights already
protected by the U.S. Constitution, is familiar.
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abuses, such as Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan. The
execution of juveniles by only a few countries with a history of human
rights abuses, coupled with international treaties and agreements
prohibiting the same, would seem to indicate an international norm
prohibiting the application of the death penalty to offenders under
56
18.
B. Jus Cogens Norm
International and regional tribunals and courts agree that
refraining from executing juveniles is a non-derogable obligation by
57
which States must abide. Non-derogable obligations are generally
defined as involving rights so fundamental that they are not subject to
58
abrogation. Likewise, jus cogens, as defined under Article 53 of the

55. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1281; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS 74 (1991)
(summarizing findings regarding the cases of twenty-three juveniles sentenced to
death under present U.S. law). Note that since Amnesty’s report, Barbados has
raised the minimum age for execution to eighteen. For a more updated calculation
of states imposing the death penalty, see Amnesty International, Juvenile Offender
Facing Execution in Virginia—A Step Backwards, A1 Index: AMR 51/76/98 (Oct. 1998).
Amnesty International reports that Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen
have executed a combined total of nine juveniles since 1990. See id. Between January
1, 1973 and December 31, 2000 the United States executed seventeen juvenile
offenders, whose age at the time of the crime, with the exception of one, was
seventeen. One offender was sixteen at the time of the crime. The ages at execution
ranged from twenty-three to thirty-eight. Id. at tbl. 1. See Streib, supra note 44, at 4,
tbl. 1. The United States was the only country to execute juveniles in both 1998 and
1999.
56. See, e.g., Joan F. Hartman, ‘Unusual’ Punishment: The Domestic Effects of
International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655,
666-67 (1983) (noting that state practices seem to indicate consistent adherence to
prohibitions on juvenile executions, but unreported inconsistencies could confuse
data); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still A Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 295-96
(1995) (stating that the United Nations Human Rights Committee implies in its
General Comment that the U.S. reservation to the provision of the Covenant
prohibiting executions of persons under eighteen is illegal because it is a violation of
customary international norms); Spillane, supra note 50, at 130-31 (stating that
executing juveniles violates international principles that are jus cogens, from which
no derogation is possible); Edward F. Sherman, Comment, The U.S. Death Penalty
Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the
Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 69, 88
(1994) (arguing that several international human rights treaties and accords reflect
international consensus on prohibition of the death penalty for juvenile offenders).
Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (asserting that the U.N.
Declaration to protect all persons from being subject to torture coupled with
modern nations’ universal renunciation of torture has the effect of binding
customary international law).
57. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (explaining the jus cogens
concept and the application of this norm by international courts and tribunals).
58. See Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 83-84 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (discussing the non-
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Vienna Convention, are peremptory norms recognized by the
59
international community from which derogation is not permitted.
60
For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared
the execution of juvenile offenders to be a violation of both
61
The Interinternational law and the doctrine of jus cogens.
American Court found that the U.S. practice of allowing the
execution of minors violated obligations under the American
62
Declaration. In addition, the United States is not only in violation

derogable nature of certain rights, such as the right to life and freedom from
torture).
59. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
60. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established, with the
formation of the Organization of American States (OAS), to protect rights that
cannot be “genuinely assured unless [the rights] are safe-guarded by a competent
court.” See Ninth International Conference of American States (Bogota, Colombia,
1948), Resolution XXXI, “Inter-American Court to Protect the Rights of Man,” cited
in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 13 (1996). The Court has advisory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction over cases submitted by either the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights or State parties to the American Convention who
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court. See id. at 14. An individual petitioner may
not assert a claim directly before the Court. See id. The Commission must first hear
the case and finalize proceedings before the Court can hear the case. See id. Cases
brought to the Commission and later referred to the Court generally arise under the
American Convention on Human Rights. See id. The American Convention is a
broad-based human rights document protecting political, social, economic, and
cultural rights. See American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records,
1978, OEA/Ser. K/XVI 1.1, Doc. 65 Rev. 1 Corr. 2 [hereinafter American
Convention]. Like most treaties, the American Convention is only binding on those
OAS member states that have formally accepted the agreement. This stands in
contrast to the OAS Charter and American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, both of which also establish human rights standards, but are binding on all
OAS members even when the states have not formally accepted the Charter or
Declaration. See generally Dinah L. Shelton, The Inter-American Human Rights System, in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 121 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed.
1999) (describing Inter-American human rights institutions).
61. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./v./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1987) [hereinafter Case 9647]. Petitioners James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton
alleged that their death sentences for crimes committed before their eighteenth
birthdays constituted a violation of the right to life under the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 9th Int’l Conf. of Am. States,
Article I, O.E.A./Ser. L/V/I.4 (1965) (adopted Mar. 30-May 2, 1948), reprinted in 43
AM. J. INT’L L. 133, 134 (Supp. 1949) [hereinafter American Declaration]. The
American Declaration protects many of the same rights as the American Convention.
The Convention, however, is more detailed. Cf. American Convention, supra note
60. In addition, the American Declaration, because OAS states are bound by its
conditions regardless of whether they have officially agreed to it, is sometimes
invoked by the Inter-American Commission and Court as a way of holding OAS states
accountable when they have not acceded to the American Convention.
62. See American Declaration, supra note 60, at 168-73. The United States is a
member state of the OAS and as such falls within the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. See Hurst Hannum, Implementing Human
Rights: An Overview of NGO Strategies and Available Procedures, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 19 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999). All
OAS countries are automatically bound by the OAS Charter and the American

LEVESQUEJCI.DOC

2001]

7/10/2001 12:19 PM

JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY

767
63

of both the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human Rights,
but also the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
64
Persons in Time of War.
II. ARGUMENT ONE: THE ICCPR IS SELF-EXECUTING
65

Congress has not implemented the ICCPR in domestic legislation.
Without implementing legislation, the courts sometimes determine
66
When courts make such a
that treaties are not self-executing.
determination, they often will not recognize an individual right
67
raised under the treaty. It is, therefore, imperative that the advocate
convince the Court that the ICCPR is a self-executing agreement that
68
69
may be raised as a defense to the execution of juveniles.
The Supreme Court first articulated a distinction between self70
executing and non-self-executing treaties in Foster v. Neilson. In this

Declaration. See generally Shelton, supra note 60, at 121 (describing Inter-American
human rights institutions).
63. See American Convention, supra note 60, art. 4(5) (“Capital punishment shall
not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under
18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant women.”).
64. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3518, 3520, art. 68, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 330 (“the
death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person who was under
eighteen years of age at the time of the offence”). The general provisions of this
treaty govern the protection of civilians during armed conflict to ensure that civilians
are treated humanely by all parties to the convention. See id. at art. 3(I), 75 U.N.T.S.
288, 291.
65. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19 (1992) (“Existing U.S. Law generally
complies with the covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated.”).
66. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 111(4).
An international agreement of the United States is “non-self-executing”
(a) if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become
effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing
legislation, (b) if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by
resolution, requires implementing legislation, or (c) if implementing
legislation is constitutionally required.
Id.
67. See id. at § 111(3) (“Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to
international law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a
“non-self-executing” agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of
necessary implementation.”). It should be noted, however, that the creation of
private rights or remedies is a distinct question from whether the treaty is selfexecuting. See id. § 111 cmt. h.
68. For an explanation of the difference between a private right of action and a
defense, see infra Part II.A.
69. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 111 cmt. h (stating that some parts of a
treaty may be self-executing while others are not).
70. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1888) (explaining that self-executing treaties require no implementing
legislation to make them operative). See generally David Sloss, The Domestication of
International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties,
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 144-52 (1999) (explaining the difference between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines
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case, the Court explained that generally, in countries without a
71
72
Supremacy Clause, such as Britain, a treaty is a contract between
73
nations, not a legislative act. The Court, however, distinguished this
concept from the principles established in the United States when it
stated, “[o]ur constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to
an act of the legislature, whenever it operates without the aid of any
74
legislative provision.”

of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) (presenting an overview of selfexecuting treaties and discussing the confusion regarding the distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties).
71. In contrast to Great Britain, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution declares that
treaties are the supreme law of the land when made under the authority of the
United States. U.S. CONST. art. VI. In addition, the Constitution states that “[t]he
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Law of the United States, and Treaties made.” U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2. As the supreme law of the land, treaties become the functional equivalent of
federal congressional statutes. See, e.g., The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99
(1884) (“A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its
provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined.”); Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (stating that a treaty is considered an act
of the legislature when it does not require implementing legislation to become
effective); see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1555, 1564-67 (1984) (stating that in U.S. law, both treaties and customary
law are law of the United States and they are equal in status to statutes and subject to
the later-in-time principle). A treaty may trump conflicting federal and state law that
was enacted before the treaty became effective. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
212 (1962) (“Though a court will not undertake to construe a treaty in a manner
inconsistent with a subsequent federal statute, no similar hesitancy obtains if the
asserted clash is with state law.”) (emphasis added); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 236 (1796) (“A treaty cannot be the Supreme law of the land, that is of all the
United States, if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its way.”); see also, e.g., Lori
Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and
“Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 531 (1991) (discussing how
states’ rights should not be asserted as impediments to full implementation of treaty
obligations).
72. In Britain, Australia, and most other Commonwealth countries, the executive
branch ratifies treaties without the consent of parliament. See Thomas Buergenthal,
Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 211, 213
(1997) (describing traditional approaches to giving domestic legal effect to
international agreements). In these countries there is a requirement that the
parliament implement the treaty in domestic law. See id.
73. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
74. Id. The Court in Foster did not actually use the term self-executing.
Nonetheless, Foster is regarded as the source of the distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties because it distinguished between treaties directed at
the political branch versus those that may be interpreted directly by the judicial
department. See Sloss, supra note 70, at 147 (arguing that Foster is widely regarded as
the origin of non-self-executing doctrine); see also Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 766-68 (1988) (arguing that all treaties are “selfexecuting” except those that, by their terms, require implementing legislation). Cf.
Barapind v. Reno, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that, “whether
a treaty is self-executing is an issue for judicial interpretation.” (citing RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 111(h)-(j))); Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New
Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 452-62 (1997) (stating that
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The Supreme Court recently applied the doctrine of non-self75
There, the
executing treaties in United States v. Alvarez-Machain.
Supreme Court allowed individuals to raise a defense under a treaty
76
in certain circumstances even without implementing legislation.
77
The Court reaffirmed that treaties are considered U.S. law and
outlined the responsibility of the Court to enforce a treaty on behalf
78
of individuals when it is self-executing. The Court did not dispute
that a defense may be valid under the extradition treaty that was at
issue in the case, but held that the defense was not successful because
79
the United States had not violated the terms of the treaty. The
dissent in this case agreed with the majority that the treaty could be
80
used as a defense. The dissent argued, however, that the United

the application of treaty provisions in U.S. courts is affected by judicially made
doctrine of self-executing treaties); Paust, supra note 74, at 760 (arguing that the
judicially created distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is
“patently inconsistent with the express language in the Constitution affirming that
‘all Treaties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.’”). See generally Yuji Iwasawa,
The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J.
INT’L L. 627, 635 (1986) (analyzing the U.S. doctrine of self-executing treaties in the
light of scholarly developments in Europe).
75. 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992).
76. The court in Alvarez-Machain relied on United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,
430 (1886), to inform its interpretation of the extradition treaty at issue. See AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. at 659. In Rauscher, the Supreme Court determined that the
defendant’s criminal charge fell outside the terms of the Webster-Ashburton
extradition treaty and, as a result, the Court found that the defendant successfully
raised the treaty as a defense to prosecution. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430, cited in
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 659-60. Relying on Rauscher, the Court in AlvarezMachain analyzed the terms of the extradition treaty to determine whether forced
abductions fell beyond the scope of the treaty. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666.
The Court concluded that the terms of the treaty did not support a prohibition of
forced abductions, however, the Court could not have reached this conclusion without
accepting the defendant’s ability to raise the treaty as a defense. See id. It was
precisely because of the defendant’s contention that the treaty prohibited his
prosecution that the case existed at all. See id. In addition, the Court relied on
several cases, such as Rauscher, in which the Court spoke explicitly about raising a
treaty as a defense despite the lack of implementing legislation. See discussion infra
Part II.B (discussing Rauscher and raising a defense even in the absence of
implementing legislation).
77. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666 (stating that treaties, like statutes, must be
construed by looking at its terms to determine the meaning).
78. See id. at 663. At issue in this case was whether a defendant may use an
extradition treaty as a defense to a court’s jurisdiction when the individual was
abducted to the United States. See id. at 657.
79. See id. at 669 (refusing to imply in the treaty a term prohibiting international
abductions, but never denying that the court would recognize a defense under the
treaty, language and meaning permitting). The Court found that the forced
abduction was conducted outside of the terms of the treaty and was not, therefore, a
violation of the treaty itself. See id. at 669-70.
80. See id. at 674-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, read the
treaty more expansively and analyzed the scope and objective of the treaty. See id. at
675.
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81

Significantly, both the
States violated the purpose of the treaty.
majority and dissenting opinions argued for the recognition of a
82
defense based on rights grounded in the treaty itself. The opinions
differ only in the interpretations of the treaty’s language and
83
purpose.
Despite decisions such as Alvarez-Machain, courts continue to
grapple with the question of exactly what determines that a treaty is
84
self-executing. More specifically, courts have difficulty determining
85
under what circumstances a treaty, having the force of law, may be
86
applied directly by the judiciary.

81. The dissent believed that the language and purpose of the treaty implied that
forced abductions were prohibited. See id. at 682. The dissent strongly contested the
majority’s failure to distinguish “between the conduct of private citizens, which does
not violate any treaty obligation, and conduct expressly authorized by the Executive
Branch of the Government, which unquestionably constitutes a flagrant violation of
international law . . . [and] a breach of our treaty obligations.” Id. The dissent’s
rationale was that an abduction that was not the result of an executive order, but
rather a decision on the part of an individual, meant that the individual was acting in
the capacity of a private citizen; therefore, his actions may fall beyond the scope of
the treaty. See id. at 682.
82. Compare id. at 669 (implying, by his silence, that a defense may be raised
under the treaty), with id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Extradition
Treaty . . . suffices to protect the defendant from prosecution despite the absence of
any express language in the Treaty itself purporting to limit this Nation’s power to
prosecute a defendant over whom it had lawfully acquired jurisdiction.”).
83. Compare id. at 666 (stating that “the language of the Treaty, in the context of
its history, does not support the proposition that the Treaty prohibits abductions
outside of its terms”), with id. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion, ‘the
manifest scope and object of the treaty itself,’ plainly imply a mutual undertaking to
respect the territorial integrity of the other contracting party . . . [that] is confirmed
by a consideration of the ‘legal context’ in which the Treaty was negotiated.”)
(citations omitted).
84. Compare Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) (stating that the term self-executing meant “no domestic legislation is
necessary to give the Warsaw Convention the force of law in the United States”), with
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 667 (holding that where the Treaty has the force of law,
the Treaty’s status as self-executing determines the Court’s power and duty to
“enforce [the Treaty] on behalf of an individual”). See, e.g., Cook v. United States,
288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (explaining that non-self-executing treaties may be
enforced in courts only after implementing legislation is enacted); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that when treaty stipulations are
non-self-executing they become operative only pursuant to legislation).
85. Some court decisions seem to indicate that non-self-executing treaties are not
considered to be the supreme law of the land. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing
Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that non-self-executing treaties “are
merely executory agreements between the two nations and have no effect on
domestic law absent additional governmental action”); United States v. Postal, 589
F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that “it was early decided that treaties affect the
municipal law of the United States only when those treaties are given effect by
congressional legislation or are, by their nature, self-executing”). These decisions
make it difficult to conceptualize how a treaty can be the supreme law of the land,
but at the same time must await implementing legislation before it has any domestic
legal effect.
86. See Vázquez, supra note 70, at 695 (arguing that courts’ application and
distinction of self-executing treaties is controversial and one of the “most
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Although the Supreme Court has not established explicit criteria to
determine the self-executing nature of a treaty, the Ninth Circuit, in
87
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., applied a four-part test to
88
determine whether a treaty is self-executing. The court stated that
an analysis should consider: (1) the purposes and objectives of the
treaty; (2) the existence of domestic procedures and institutions
appropriate for direct implementation; (3) the availability and
feasibility of alternative enforcement methods; and (4) the
immediate and long-range social consequences of self-execution or
89
non-self-execution. Parts A, B, and C apply the Ninth Circuit’s test
to the ICCPR.
A. The ICCPR is Self-Executing Because the United States Intended the
Declaration to Apply Only to Private Rights of Action
Courts, in determining the scope of any treaty, look to the object
90
and purpose of the language and agreement as a whole.
They
91
begin, however, with the literal language of the treaty. When the
text is unclear, courts may resort to extrinsic evidence to aid in their
92
interpretation.
In addition, they may look to the history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the construction adopted by the

confounding” distinctions in the law of treaties (citing Postal, 589 F.2d at 876; United
States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Fla. 1992))).
87. 771 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985).
88. See id. at 1283 (discussing the four-part test for a self-executing treaty).
89. See id. (quoting People of Saipan v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d
90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974)); see also Barapind v. Reno, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148-49 (E.D.
Cal. 1999) (applying Ninth Circuit standard).
90. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“International agreements, like other contracts . . .
are to be read in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time
they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the
[nations] thereby contracting.” (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32
(1912))); see also Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (stating that courts
construe terms of a treaty in line with the ordinary meaning within the international
community).
91. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (noting that interpretation of
a treaty must begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which words are
written and used (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1963)));
United States v. M.H. Pulaski Co., 243 U.S. 97, 106 (1917) (stating that “there is a
strong presumption that the literal meaning [of a treaty] is the true one”).
92. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (stating that the
drafting history of an international covenant may be consulted to “elucidate”
ambiguous text, but when the text is clear, the Supreme Court has no power to insert
an amendment (citing Air France, 470 U.S. at 392)); see also Choctaw Nation of
Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) (stating that courts should
interpret treaties more liberally than private agreements and the court may look at
history, negotiations, and practical construction so as to maintain the spirit of the
treaty); United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 531 (1900) (stating that if
words are ambiguous, courts may resort to written or oral evidence that will disclose
circumstances of treaty).
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93

parties. Thus, treaties may be liberally construed to carry out the
94
intention of the parties.
95
In order to prove that the United States intended to bar only
96
private rights of action under the ICCPR and not defenses, the
97
In More v.
advocate should consider and argue several factors.
98
Intelcom Support Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit considered several of
the following criteria to determine the parties’ intent in signing the
agreement:
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole;
(2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of
the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and
feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the
implications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the
99
capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.

These factors do not appear to constitute a rigid six-pronged test;
100
In fact, as
as the court in More intended, they act as a guideline.
Professor Vázquez points out, the court simply considered these
factors to be relevant to the constructive interest of the treaty makers,

93. See Air France, 470 U.S. at 396 (concluding that the language, history, and
policy of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement were relevant in
determining whether liability attached to the airline).
94. See De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (stating that treaties may be
susceptible to multiple interpretations, and that parties’ intentions in terms of
effectuating equality and reciprocity are important in interpretations).
95. Part II.A of this Comment discusses the intent of the Senate to bar only
private rights of action. Part II.B, though similar in content, focuses on court
precedents and historical interpretations of treaties that support the use of treaties as
a defense even when they are not, as a whole, considered self-executing.
96. See infra notes 114-123 (discussing the differences between a private right of
action and a defense for the purposes of the ICCPR).
97. Professor McDonnell notes that “most parties to an international convention
are indifferent as to how individual states carry out their international obligations, as
long as they do so.” Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in
American Courts—Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by
Foreign Defendents Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1440
(1996).
98. 960 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 469 (citing Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370,
373 (7th Cir. 1985)).
100. See More, 960 F.2d at 469-72 (stating courts utilize these factors when
attempting to determine the meaning of the treaty, but such interpretations are
better left to the Executive branch). Note that, although the court utilizes these
factors, it has not established an explicit six-prong test, and the analysis is less
exacting than a stringent test); see also Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373 (stating that if the
parties’ intent is clear from the treaty’s language courts will not analyze other
factors). The Frolova court also stated that the issue of whether a treaty is selfexecuting is determined by judicial interpretation. See id. at 373 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 154(1) (1965)). In Frolova, the court did not
explicitly follow each guideline laid out, but rather considered the treaty at issue, the
United Nations Charter, more generally, though keeping those factors listed in
mind. See id. at 373-75.
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101

Therefore, the advocate need not
rather than an actual intent.
address explicitly each of the factors. The advocate should turn first
to the language of the treaty. Declaration One of the ICCPR states
that, “the provisions of articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not
102
Article Two, paragraph 3(a) of the ICCPR,
self-executing.”
however, states that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes: [t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
103
acting in an official capacity.” The ICCPR cannot be internationally
binding and contain language invoking a remedy for individual
violations and yet not infer a domestic basis for raising this treaty as a
104
defense to offending governmental action.
Article Two, when read together with the Senate’s declaration
announcing that the ICCPR is non-self-executing, creates a
discrepancy between the language and meaning of the ICCPR. Due
to the potential for varying interpretations of the parties’ intent
regarding a treaty’s self-executing nature, further investigation of the
105
treaty beyond its facial construction is necessary. Assuming that the
non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR applies to defenses raised
under the treaty, one would logically conclude that an individual
cannot find a remedy in United States courts under Article Two,
106
paragraph 3(a). Beyond the general declaration that the ICCPR is
non-self-executing, the United States has not declared an
107
understanding or reservation to Article Two of the ICCPR.

101. See Vázquez, supra note 70, at 711 (explaining also that even more than the
intent, courts use these factors to determine whether a treaty has the markings of a
self-executing treaty).
102. STATUS REPORT, supra note 28, declaration 1, at 139.
103. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2(3)(a), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. In addition, Article
Three, paragraph 3(b), states that “[t]o ensure that any person claiming such a
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative
or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy . . . .” Id.
104. See United States v. Hongla-Yamache, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 76-77 (D. Mass.
1999) (stating that language of Article 36 of Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations establishes an individual right). Although the defendant’s motions were
denied in this case, the court nonetheless recognized his individual right (standing)
to raise the treaty as a defense to the alleged violations. See id. at 77-78 (noting that
other courts support the conclusion that individuals’ standing is established by the
language of Article 36).
105. See More, 960 F.2d at 469 (noting that other courts have considered
circumstances surrounding a treaty’s execution, and nature of obligations under a
treaty as relevant in determining parties’ intent).
106. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2(3)(a), U.N.T.S. at 174.
107. See generally STATUS REPORT, supra note 28, at 143-44 (listing five reservations
and four understandings, none of which mentions Article Two). An advocate should
argue that the United States intends to be bound by Article Two because the
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Moreover, if the United States intended the non-self-executing
declaration to apply to defense claims as well as private rights of
action, Article Two would negate the purpose of the treaty as a
human rights agreement established to protect individuals within a
108
These ambiguities between the text of
government’s jurisdiction.
the ICCPR articles affording rights to individuals and declarations
that purport to limit these rights should signal to the court the need
for further inquiry.
The current Administration and the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations support an interpretation of the ICCPR that allows an
individual to raise a defense. The Committee declared the ICCPR to
109
be non-self-executing only with respect “to private causes of action.”
Indeed, the language used throughout the legislative history to create
or limit a private right of action under the ICCPR has differed
110
depending on the executive administration in power at the time.
For example, there was a historical shift between the Carter
administration and the Bush and Clinton administrations. The
Carter administration considered non-self-executing provisions of
treaties to be such because they did not “supercede prior inconsistent
federal law because the ‘substantive provisions of the treaties would
111
not of themselves become effective as domestic law.’”
This

declaration concerning the non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR only applies to
private rights of action. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 657 (1992); cf. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-29, at 8 (1994) [hereinafter RACE REPORT]
(invoking the “private rights of action” explanation for non-self-executing nature of
Race Convention). The Administration did not feel there was a need to create
additional avenues for enforcement of the essential requirements of the Convention.
See id. (noting the pre-existing provisions of U.S. law, which grant sufficient
protections and remedies).
108. See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment] (stating that the
purpose of the ICCPR is “that the rights contained therein should be ensured to all
those under a state party’s jurisdiction”).
109. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 (“For reasons
of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the substantive provisions
of the Covenant are not self-executing. The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will
not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts.”) (emphasis added); see also Sloss,
supra note 70, at 166 (noting that the Bush Administration, under which reservations
to ICCPR were made, was the first administration to use the term “private cause of
action” to explain the meaning of non-self-executing declaration). The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations only states that the ICCPR will be non-self-executing
for private rights of action; it does not make the same statement in reference to
raising defenses. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657.
110. See Sloss, supra note 70, at 154-59 (noting that each administration develops
its own explanations and interpretations of non-self-executing declarations).
111. Id. at 170 (citing Message from President of the United States Transmitting Four
Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. EXEC. DOC. C, D, E, and F, 95-2 at vi (1978)).
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interpretation of self-executing follows the reasoning applied in
Foster, in which a treaty’s self-executing nature is dependent upon
112
whether there is implementing legislation.
A private cause of action, which is prohibited when a treaty is non113
self-executing, is not synonymous with a defense, and is permitted
under the treaty. The Bush and Clinton administrations defined
non-self-executing treaties as agreements that do not create “new or
114
independently enforceable private cause[s] of action.” Under this
interpretation it should not matter that Congress has not
115
implemented the ICCPR through legislation.
Rather, this
interpretation focuses on whether the claim is an affirmative legal
116
claim and therefore a new private cause of action.
The Bush and
Clinton definition of non-self-executing treaties is broader and shifts
117
the focus away from whether implementing legislation exists and
118
toward whether the claim is affirmative or a defense. An advocate
should argue that this is another indication of an intent to limit only
affirmative claims while allowing defenses raised under the ICCPR,
119
regardless of whether implementing legislation exists.

112. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (declaring that the
widely-held belief that a treaty is a contract does not apply in the United States
because the Constitution considers a treaty as the law of the land).
113. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 221 (6th ed. 1990) (defining cause of action as
“[t]he fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial redress or relief against
another . . . . The right which a party has to institute a judicial proceeding.”)
(emphasis added); cf. id. at 419 (defining defense as “[t]hat which is put forward to
diminish plaintiff’s cause of action or defeat recovery. Evidence offered by accused to
defeat criminal charge.”) (emphasis added).
114. Sloss, supra note 70, at 170 (citing Telephone Interview with David Stewart,
Office of Legal Adviser, Department of State (Oct. 20, 1998)).
115. See id. at 169 (noting that under the private cause of action definition, the
courts could apply the treaty directly, thereby bypassing implementing legislation to
enforce defendants’ rights).
116. See id. at 168-69 (arguing that this interpretation of the ICCPR is consistent
with the Clinton administration’s treatment of the Race Covenant with regard to
private causes of action).
117. See id. at 170.
118. See id. (discussing the private cause of action definition in terms of creating
new and independent claims, rather than implementing legislation).
119. See id. at 170. A recent decision tacitly approves the distinction between a
“private right of action” and a defense for the purpose of determining whether the
ICCPR is self-executing. See Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D.
Ga. 2000). This court explains non-self-executing by referencing the Bush
Administration’s definition, which is that the “Covenant will not create a private
cause of action in U.S. courts.” See id. The court then, however, cites to David Sloss’s
article, in which the author explains non-self-executing treaties. See id. (citing Sloss,
supra note 70). The article exposes the differences between the use of self-executing
treaties for support of private causes of action and as a defense. The Sloss article
advocates that a defense raised under the ICCPR is not barred even though the treaty
may be considered non-self-executing for the purpose of raising a private right of
action. See Sloss, supra note 70, at 135. The court in Ralk accepted this distinction
and used it to support its argument. See 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
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B. The ICCPR, When Raised as a Defense, May Be Judicially Applied Even
in the Absence of Implementing Legislation
Although though many courts have determined a treaty to be selfexecuting only when there is a corresponding right to bring a private
120
claim, the self-executing nature of the treaty is not dispositive when
121
Professor Vázquez supports a distinction
it is raised as a defense.
between raising a claim under a treaty and raising the treaty as a
defense. He points out the potential for erroneously interpreting a
defense raised under a treaty as synonymous with maintaining a
122
private action.

120. See, e.g., Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir.
1992) (“Courts will only find a treaty to be self-executing if the document, as a whole,
evidences an intent to provide a private right of action.”); More v. Intelcom Support
Servs., 960 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060,
1066 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.
1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleaum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298
(3d Cir. 1979); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976); Barapind v.
Reno, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 1999); Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d
943, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1998); United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (E.D. La.
1998); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 798 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Handel v.
Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
121. In instances where the treaty is raised as a defense, the courts do not reach
the issue of whether the treaty is self-executing, but rather assess whether the defense
is valid under the treaty, regardless of its self-executing nature. See Kolovrat v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191 (1961) (finding that Oregon could not refuse to uphold
petitioner’s treaty rights and therefore could not escheat petitioner’s personal
property located in Oregon). The petitioners in Kolovrat raised a treaty as a defense
to the State’s action of escheating their property. See id. (noting that the petitioners
had the same rights as a citizen’s next of kin to inherit property); see also Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1933) (concluding that ship’s master had the
right to raise the United States government’s violation of a treaty as a defense to
personal jurisdiction); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1927) (raising a
treaty as defense to personal jurisdiction); Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138,
145-46 (1914) (stating that defense under the treaty was not problematic, but ruling
that there was no conflict between the treaty and state law); United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420 (1886) (accepting a treaty as a defense to jurisdiction
because the extradition treaty was used for an object and purpose beyond securing
the trial of a person extradited for a specific offense enumerated in the treaty);
McDonnell, supra note 97, at 1440 (noting that in Rauscher, the defense raised was a
valid but unintended consequence of treaty); cf. Paust, supra note 74, at 772-73
(tracing Supreme Court cases in which a treaty is applied without addressing whether
it is self-executing).
122. See Vázquez, supra note 70, at 721 (stating that the decision in Tel-Oren
confused a right of action with self-execution and the defendant’s ability to raise a
treaty as a defense to criminal prosecution, because the latter does not require a
private right of action). Cf. generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346-49 (1995)
(discussing the non-self-executing declaration of International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the ICCPR); Jordan J. Paust,
Avoiding Fraudulent Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1283-84 (1993) (arguing that the
attempted non-self-execution policy of the Bush Administration regarding the
ICCPR was an abuse of executive power); John Quigley, The International Covenant on
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123

The seminal case of United States v. Rauscher “implicitly held that a
direct beneficiary of a treaty may invoke that treaty as a defense even
if the defendant was an unintended beneficiary or the treaty does not
124
expressly grant the defendant or individuals in his class any rights.”
In Rauscher, the Court focused on the defendant’s use of the treaty as
125
a defense and only indirectly discussed the difference between self126
executing and non-self-executing treaties between the United States
127
and Great Britain. The Court reasoned that a treaty, as the law of
the land, operates as an act of Congress and as such must be
128
interpreted and enforced by the courts.
The Court found that
treaties confer certain rights on private citizens when the treaty
prescribes a rule governing a right that is “of [the] nature” of rights
129
enforceable in the courts.
The defendant had a right to raise the
treaty as a defense because the Court did not have jurisdiction over
those offenses that fell beyond the scope of the treaty under which he
130
was extradited.
The dissent in Rauscher also supports the contention that an
131
individual may raise a treaty as a defense. Justice Waite “conceded”
that the treaty was a part of the law of the United States, as are
132
He agreed with the majority that a
congressional statutes.
133
defendant may use the treaty as a defense to a prosecution. Justice

Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1302-04
(1993) (determining whether the declaration surrounding the self-executing nature
of the treaty has legal authority).
123. 119 U.S. 407, 432-33 (1886).
124. McDonnell, supra note 97, at 1447. McDonnell also notes that Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927), a case in which defendants also raised a treaty as a
defense, supports the conclusion that defendants may be unintended, but judicially
recognized, beneficiaries of a treaty. Id.
125. The defendant was extradited under the 1842 Ashburton Treaty. See
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 410. The treaty governed the boundaries between American
and British territories. See id. The treaty also aimed to end the African slave trade,
and it governed the extradition of criminals in specific cases. See id. The treaty did
not facially state that a defendant could only be extradited for those crimes explicitly
enumerated in the treaty. See id. at 410-11. The Court determined, however, that the
defendant could not be tried for additional crimes that were not listed in the treaty.
See id. at 420.
126. See id. at 418 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), in
which the Court explained that treaties are the supreme law of the United States and
only require political, rather than judicial implementation, when the terms of the
treaty require either of the parties to “perform a particular [affirmative] act”).
127. See id. at 410.
128. See id. at 419 (stating that courts must take judicial notice of the 1842 treaty
because it is incorporated as part of the supreme law of the land).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 430 (“One can only be tried for one of the offenses described in [a]
treaty.”).
131. See id. at 434 (Waite, C.J., dissenting).
132. See id. (Waite, C.J., dissenting).
133. See id. (Waite, C.J., dissenting).
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Waite dissented because he disagreed with the Court’s interpretation
of the treaty and felt that the Court had proper jurisdiction over all of
134
the offenses because the extradition complied with the treaty.
More recently, a U.S. District Court reached the merits of a claim
without discussing the non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR. In
135
United States v. Benitez, the defendants, charged with assaulting
several DEA agents, raised the ICCPR as a defense to their indictment
on the grounds that their country of residence already tried and
136
convicted them on the same charges.
The court accepted this
defense and did not address the issue of whether the ICCPR is self137
The Court, did however, address the merits, thereby
executing.
138
accepting the treaty’s application when used as a defense.
The
court instead found that the ICCPR did not provide the relief that

134. See id. (Waite, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “the treaty under which he was
surrendered has granted [the defendant] no immunity, and therefore, it has not
provided him with a new defense”).
135. 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1998). Courts have begun to cite the
ICCPR for assistance in interpreting statutory or international law provisions. See,
e.g., Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) (using the
ICCPR to support the proposition that in the context of a claim arising under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, there is an international prohibition against arbitrary arrest
and detention); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1252 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (utilizing international human rights agreements including the ICCPR to
determine that arbitrary deprivation of life is a violation of jus cogens norms);
Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (E.D. La. 1996) (stating that
although the ICCPR was not dispositive in that case, the principles outlined in the
treaty reinforce plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process rights); Abebe-Jiri
v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304, at *4 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (using
ICCPR as evidence that plaintiffs were subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment or punishment).
136. See Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (holding that Article 14(7) of the ICCPR,
which provides that no person shall be subject to double jeopardy, is not applicable
in this case because the provision does not refer to convictions in different
countries).
137. Unlike the Benitez decision, the following courts found the ICCPR to be nonself-executing and therefore unable to sustain a private right of action. The courts
did not reach the merits of the ICCPR claim. See, e.g., Igartua De La Rosa v. United
States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that appellant’s right to vote under
Article 25 of ICCPR is not a privately enforceable right under U.S. law because the
ICCPR is non-self-executing); Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 43 (D. Mass.
1999) (noting that the ICCPR is non-self-executing and plaintiffs have other
adequate domestic remedies available for their claims of “crimes against humanity”);
Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding
that defendant’s civil rights claim under the ICCPR that a stun belt placed on him
prior to sentencing violated the treaty could not stand because treaty is non-selfexecuting); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (stating that
“the United States Senate expressly declared that the relevant provisions of the
[Covenant] were not self-executing when it addressed this issue providing advice and
consent to the ratification”); In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17
(D. Conn. 1997) (stating that the ICCPR, because it is non-self-executing, could not
support a claim arguing against extradition).
138. See id.
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139

the defendants sought. The court reasoned that the Human Rights
Committee itself, established under Article 20 of the ICCPR, had
previously held that the treaty did not bar prosecution in a case
140
“almost identical to the present [one].” The Committee’s previous
decision was dispositive and the court therefore rejected the
141
defense.
The Southern Florida District Court also found that the
ICCPR, as an international agreement prescribing how each state
party must treat individuals within its own jurisdiction, supports the
142
propriety of raising the treaty as a defense to their indictment.
C. A Defense Under Article Six is Easily Justiciable
Article Two, paragraph 2(2) of the ICCPR states:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect
143
to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

This section of the ICCPR demonstrates that the treaty only
requires legislation or other measures necessary to carry out the
144
rights recognized under the ICCPR when it is appropriate.
This
section of the ICCPR does not require each country to implement in
145
legislation specific provisions of the ICCPR.
Indeed, it is of no
consequence to the countries that are parties to the ICCPR how other
states comply with their obligations, as long as they fulfill their

139. See Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64 (finding that “the ICCPR . . . bars only
successive prosecution by the same governments”); cf. Freedom to Travel Campaign
v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding, without deciding the
issue of whether the ICCPR is non-self-executing, that no conflict existed between
the ICCPR and the U.S. Cuban Asset Control Regulations). This case is similar to
Benitez because the court assessed the defense claim on its merits without concluding
that the ICCPR was non-self executing.
140. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1364.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 1363-64; see also General Comment, supra note 108, at 4 (“The
intention of the Covenant is that the rights contained therein should be ensured to
all those under a State party’s jurisdiction.”).
143. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
144. See Paust, supra note 19, at 326 (“[I]t is appropriate to clarify that . . . the
Covenant will apply to state and local authorities . . . the intent is not to modify or
limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant . . . . [It is] intended to signal to our
treaty partners that the U.S. will implement its obligations under the Covenant by
appropriate legislative, executive and judicial means, federal or state as
appropriate . . . .” (quoting Explanation of Proposed Reservations, Understandings
and Declarations, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 17-19 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645,
657 (1992))).
145. See McDonnell, supra note 97, at 1429.
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146

responsibilities under the treaty.
The issue of justiciability is related to the self-executing nature of
the treaty because the courts must assess how to recognize an
individual right in the absence of legislation. Professor Vázquez
147
discusses how the “‘self-execution’ rubric”
often means that
concerns such as “whether the claim is justiciable,” whether an
individual has standing to bring the claim, and “whether the litigant
has a right of action” are combined into a general analysis of self148
execution.
United States courts generally require that a treaty’s
language be sufficiently specific for an individual to invoke the
149
Articles of charters and declarations
treaty’s provision in court.
considered overly broad by the courts are interpreted to impose
affirmative obligations on a government to improve such things as
living conditions and social standards, or to provide universal
150
education or medical care.
Courts will find, however, that certain
151
prohibited acts, when they are “specific, universal, and obligatory,”

146. See id. It is instructive to note the difference between the law of nations and
treaties generally with respect to domestic obligations. The law of nations allows
each state to make its own decisions concerning the enforcement of internationally
recognized norms. See Henkin, supra note 11, at 245 (“[I]nternational law itself, . . .
does not require any particular reaction to violations of law . . . . Whether and how
the United States should react to such violations are domestic questions . . . .”).
Treaties, however, establish the obligations and the extent to which they are
enforceable. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1984). The ICCPR, pursuant to Article Six, established that each state is obligated to
abstain from executing juveniles. The ICCPR does not, however, dictate how each
country should implement or enforce the provision. The country must only do
whatever is necessary to ensure that it fulfills its obligation. See ICCPR, supra note 24,
art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74.
147. See Vázquez, supra note 70, at 711 (referring to the factors examined by
courts under the self-execution rubric).
148. See id. Vázquez notes that Frolova is an example of the courts’ mingling of the
concepts surrounding self-execution and justiciability. See id. at 711. He claims that
the court really did not analyze the intent of the treaty makers, but rather addressed
factors unrelated to intent, which advise against judicial enforcement. See id. The
factors addressed by the court included the purpose of the agreement as a whole and
the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement. See id.
149. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-74
(7th Cir. 1985) (stating that Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter were
phrased in broad generalities and did not indicate a “code of legal rights”); Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring) (explaining that Articles One and Two of the
United Nations Charter contain only general “purposes and principles,” some of
which are “mere aspirations and none of which can sensibly be thought to have been
intended to be judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals”); United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979) (observing that the Convention on the High
Seas, as its preamble states, was only intended to be “generally declaratory of
established principles of international law”).
150. See cases cited supra note 149 (explaining courts’ interpretations of broad
charters and preambles).
151. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-17 (9th
Cir. 1992) (finding that torture is a specific, universal, and obligatory norm that also
reaches the level of jus cogens).
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may form the basis of a private right of action.
153
The Ninth Circuit in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina
found that torture constituted a specific enough violation of
154
international law to find that a private right of action existed. The
155
same court found in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, however, that the
“international law norm against cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment is not sufficiently specific such that violations of that norm
156
are actionable under § 1350 [of the Alien Tort Claims Act].” Even
though “cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment” is too vague to
form a private cause of action, the Ninth Circuit in Siderman found
torture to be a form of “cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment,”
157
and specific enough to constitute a private right of action.
The specificity requirement increases the claim’s justiciability
because in the absence of legislation, courts have a basis upon which
to formulate a decision. Negative obligations such as these, which
158
require the government to abstain from action, are more easily
justiciable because the meaning of the provision is clear from the
159
language of the treaty and legislation is unnecessary. Article Six of
the ICCPR is one such provision. Implementing legislation or
regulations are, therefore, unnecessary when the provision clearly
states that executing minors is prohibited under all circumstances.

152. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that
under the Alien Tort Claims Act specific tortious violations of international law are
enough to create a cause of action, even when there is no recourse under other
domestic laws).
153. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
154. See id. at 714-17.
155. 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 794. Under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ACTA), federal courts have
original jurisdiction for torts only over any civil action brought by an alien. This tort
must be committed in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 350 (1994).
157. See Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716 (stating that torture is a recognizable violation
of the law of nations and it is defined as “universal, obligatory, and definable” (citing
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987))).
158. The Restatement explains why negative treaty provisions are self-executing.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 111, reporter’s note 5. It quotes Commonwealth v.
Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878):
[If a treaty states] that certain acts shall not be done, or that certain
limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded or exceeded by the
contracting parties, the compact does not need to be supplemented by
legislative or executive action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline to
override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed restrictions, for the
palpable and all-sufficient reason, that to do so would be not only to violate
the public faith, but to transgress the “supreme law of the land.”
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 111, reporter’s note 5.
159. See id. (“Obligations not to act, or to act only subject to limitations, are
generally self-executing.”).
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III. ARGUMENT TWO: THE RESERVATION TO ARTICLE SIX OF THE
ICCPR IS INVALID
The reservation to Article Six is the second hurdle facing an
advocate once the ICCPR is accepted as a self-executing treaty for the
purposes of raising a defense. The advocate should argue that the
Senate’s reservation to Article Six of the ICCPR is invalid and violates
both the object and purpose of the ICCPR as a human rights
160
agreement, as well as the non-derogable nature of the prohibition
against executing juveniles.
The Senate’s reservation to Article Six of the ICCPR states: “[T]he
United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person . . . duly
convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of
capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes
161
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”
To date, relatively few cases exist in which courts discuss the
ICCPR, and even fewer cases analyze the reservation to Article Six. It
is important to address potential concerns regarding the reservation
162
to ensure that the courts will address the merits of the claim.
In
163
White v. Johnson,
the Fifth Circuit determined that a claim
challenging his death sentence under the ICCPR was precluded by
164
The petitioner argued that the United
the Senate’s reservation.

160. Professor Louis Henkin argues that the United States’ reservations,
understandings, and declarations
appear to be guided by several “principles”: (1) the United States will not
undertake any treaty obligation that it will not be able to carry out because it
is inconsistent with the United States Constitution; (2) United States
adherence to an international human rights treaty should not effect—or
promise—change in existing U.S. law or practice; (3) the United States will
not submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide
disputes as to the interpretation or application of human rights conventions;
(4) every human rights treaty to which the United States adheres should be
subject to a “federalism clause” so that the United States could leave
implementation of the convention largely to the states; and (5) every
international human rights agreement should be “non-self-executing.”
Henkin, supra note 122, at 341.
161. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Resolution of Ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
162. See infra notes 163-170 (discussing White v. Johnson and explaining the
obstacle of the reservation).
163. 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996).
164. See id. at 437-39 & 440 n.2. In this case, the defendant was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. The defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus
relief, claiming that the seventeen-year delay between sentencing and execution
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and
international law. See id. at 436-37. The Fifth Circuit found that there was no
precedent to support the defendant’s claim, and that his final conviction in 1990 did
not violate international law in effect at that time. See id. at 437-39 & 440 n.2. The
court also noted the Senate’s reservations with respect to the treaty, which state that
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States had signed the ICCPR since the time of his conviction. He,
therefore, asserted that because the treaty prohibited “torture or
166
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment,”
his
sentence, and more importantly the long delay between his
conviction and the execution of the death penalty, violated
167
international law.
This case does not, however, restrict or limit a
claim such as the one discussed in this primer. In White, the
petitioner alleged primarily that the length of time he spent on death
row violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
168
unusual punishment.
The petitioner did not argue that the
reservation to the ICCPR was invalid and, consequently, the court
never addressed the validity of the reservation. Rather, the court
merely acknowledged, in a footnote, that the reservation existed and
169
This
that it may create an obstacle to raising this type of defense.
case, alone, does not bar a claim of the sort discussed in this
170
primer.
171
The Nevada Supreme Court in Domingues v. Nevada, one of the
only other cases where the courts have questioned the validity of the
reservation, rejected the defendant’s claim under the ICCPR because

the United States “understands the language . . . to mean ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ as defined by the eighth amendment.” Id. at 440 n.2. Interestingly,
the court did not state that all reservations bar claims, but rather, the court assumed
that, in light of the reservation, the language of the treaty indicated the Senate’s
intent to interpret the treaty in regard to the Eighth Amendment and not
international laws and standards. See id.
165. See id. at 440 & 440 n.2.
166. Id. at 440 n.2.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 436.
169. See id. at 440 n.2 (discussing in dicta that U.S. Senate filed a reservation).
170. White is the only federal appellate court decision that discusses the
reservation, even in a precursory manner. There are several district court cases in
which the reservation is discussed. The petitioners, however did not raise the validity
of the reservation and it was not addressed by the court. See Austin v. Hopper, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 1210, 1260 n.222 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (stating that Article Seven of ICCPR,
which prohibits torture and cruel and unusual punishment, does not grant
protection beyond the Eight Amendment because the United States had declared a
reservation to the article). Note, however, that in Austin, the plaintiff challenged
four policies of the Alabama prison system and alleged that the policies were
violations of the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 1215.
The plaintiff did not even raise the ICCPR in the allegations. Rather, the court
included the ICCPR in a discussion of international agreements, all of which were
sparked by the plaintiff’s inclusion of a U.N. guide to prison treatment rules in his
exhibits. See id. at 1260 n.222. Ralk v. Lincoln County, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 763, at
*30-31 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 18, 2000), also discusses briefly the United States’ reservation to
Article 10 of the ICCPR. Again, the plaintiff did not address the reservation’s
validity. Cf. Grandison v. Corcoran, 78 F. Supp. 2d 499, 517 (D. Md. 2000) (citing
White as an indication that the ICCPR does not afford more protection than the
Constitution, but never mentioning explicitly reservations to the ICCPR).
171. 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998).
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the United States is not bound by Article Six due to the Senate’s
172
The dissent in Domingues urged, however, a complete
reservation.
consideration of the reservation’s validity and an evaluation of
173
whether the United States continues to be a party to the ICCPR.
Domingues is not dispositive to our case because, again, federal courts
are not bound by state court decisions.
As a result of these cases, the advocate should support a defense
raised under the ICCPR by analyzing the reservation’s validity.
Turning first to the language of the treaty, Article 4(2) of the ICCPR
states that “[n]o derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs one and
174
two), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made under this provision.”
Although there is no formula to determine under what conditions a
reservation may be valid, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
issued an opinion linking the non-derogable provisions of a treaty
175
with the incompatibility principle of the Law of Nations.
In this
advisory opinion, the court defined the incompatibility doctrine
when it stated that a reservation violating a non-derogable right is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and is
176
The Human Rights Committee,
therefore not permitted.
177
established under the ICCPR, affirmed that some components of
the death penalty reservation may be “incompatible with the object
178
and purpose of the Covenant” causing these reservations to be

172. See id. at 1280 (finding the U.S. Senate’s express reservation negates
Domingues’s claim that he was illegally sentenced).
173. See id. at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting) (“The penultimate issue that the district
court should have considered is whether the Senate’s reservation was valid.”).
174. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
175. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983), at 23 I.L.M. 320
(1984).
176. See id. at ¶ 61, 23 I.L.M. at 341. The International Court of Justice also
addressed the issue of reservations when it stated that a state declaring a reservation
continues to be a party to the Genocide Convention if the reservation is compatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention. See Reservations to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 29-30
(May 28) (advisory opinion). Advocates should argue that the United States is still a
party to the ICCPR, but that its reservation is invalid. Professor Henkin states that
the usual consequence of an invalid reservation is that the reservation “will generally
be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party
without benefit of the reservation.” See Henkin, supra note 122, at 350 n.11 (citing
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., ¶18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, (1994)).
Defendants, therefore, may assert a defense under Article Six because, in the absence
of a valid reservation, the United States continues to be bound by this article.
177. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 28(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 179 (establishing Human
Rights Committee consisting of eighteen members who oversee the implementation
of the ICCPR).
178. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg., ¶ 14, at 3, U.N. Doc.
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179

invalid. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights also discussed
the object and purpose of treaties, stating that modern human rights
treaties, such as the ICCPR, stand for the protection of “basic rights
of individual human beings . . . against the State of their nationality
180
In light of the above opinions,
and all other contracting States.”
the Senate’s reservation is incompatible with the purpose of the
treaty and signifies the United States’ non-compliance with its
181
international obligations under Article Six.
External to the language of the ICCPR and decisions interpreting
specific reservations to Article Six, Article 19(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes that a party may not
formulate a reservation that is incompatible with the object and
182
purpose of the treaty. Although the United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention, the State Department recognizes this treaty
183
as a guide to international law and practice.

CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995).
179. See id. (noting the possible incompatibility of the Covenant). Professor
Schabas also notes that if the United States’ reservation to the death penalty is
invalid, rules governing whether the reservation may be severed from the remaining
portions of the treaty have significant legal consequences for the parties involved. See
Schabas, supra note 56, at 278.
180. See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American
Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. A: Judgments and opinions, No. 2, ¶ 29 (1982), at 22 I.L.M.
37, 47 (1983).
181. See Sherman, supra note 56, at 75 (discussing compatibility principle under
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Note that the legal significance of an
invalid reservation is unclear. If the invalid reservation cannot be separated from the
remaining treaty, the United States is no longer a party. See Schabas, supra note 56,
at 278. Eleven state parties objected to the United States’ death penalty reservation,
agreeing that it was incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR. See
STATUS REPORT, supra note 28, at 139-43. These parties, however, did not view the
reservation as an obstacle to their obligations under the treaty between them and the
United States. See Sherman, supra note 56, at 75-76.
182. See Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337. The
Vienna Convention is unique because it governs the law and practice of treaties and
does not regulate agreements between states in particular fields such as human rights
or trade. See id. at art. 3, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333.
183. The legal advisor to the State Department noted,
[w]hile the United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, [the United States] has consistently applied those of its
terms which constitute a codification of customary international law. Most
provisions of the Vienna Convention, including Articles 31 and 32 on
matters of treaty interpretation, are declaratory of customary international
law.
See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 8, Domingues v. Nev., 528 U.S. 963 (1999) (No. 988327) (quoting Marian I. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 147 (1981) (citing Commentary of the
International Law Commission, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
A/Conf.39/11/Add.2, at 38 (1971))); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, Part III,
Introductory Note.
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For the reasons discussed above, the advocate should argue that
the United States’ reservation to Article Six of the ICCPR is invalid.
Only then will a court address the merits of the claim.
IV. ARGUMENT THREE: RECOGNIZING ARTICLE SIX AS A DEFENSE DOES
NOT THREATEN THE INTEGRITY OF FEDERALISM OR THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE
The arguments reviewed thus far pertain to whether the ICCPR is
self-executing and whether congressional intent prohibiting a private
right of action only applies to affirmative claims and not defenses.
These arguments form the primary basis upon which the advocate
will argue for the court’s recognition of a defense raised under the
ICCPR. However, the advocate should also briefly address the court’s
Federalism and Separation of Powers concerns to ensure there are no
other factors that will influence the court to abstain, in its discretion,
184
from hearing the case.
A. Separation of Powers and the Political Question
It is well-established doctrine that claims arising under treaties fall
185
Indeed, many court
within federal courts’ original jurisdiction.
decisions discussed throughout this primer involve the courts’
interpretations of treaties and their assessments of private claims.
When analyzing a claim under Article Six of the ICCPR, however, the
court must delve into the validity of reservations and declarations that
186
the executive and legislative branches have attached to the treaty.
The confluence of judicial, executive, and legislative decision-making

184. The brief arguments that follow are prophylactic because they do not form
an essential part of the overall argument. The purpose of these additional
arguments is to encourage the court to approach the interpretation of the ICCPR in
the same manner it would any other treaty that does not involve an individual claim
against a citizen’s own government. As noted in the introduction, the ICCPR
represents a rather new breed of treaty and the advocate should ensure that the
Court interprets and renders a decision based on existing precedence.
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). This statute establishes the original jurisdiction
of the Court, including claims arising under federal laws and treaties, and uses the
language of the Constitution. In addition, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1994), gives original jurisdiction to district courts when an alien brings a tort
action against the United States for a tort committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty.
186. For a detailed list of Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted treaties,
categorized by the judicial make-up of the Court (the Rehnquist Court, for
example), see David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political
Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1489 n.98 (1999). Professor Bederman also
outlines the cases in which the Court interpreted the treaty with great deference to
the executive branch and those fewer decisions in which the Court appeared to
decide in a manner that was contrary to the federal government. See id. at 1466.
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in this regard triggers an inquiry into the political question doctrine
188
and potential “separation of powers” concerns.
The political question doctrine is judicially created and establishes
that some legal issues lie beyond judicial resolution and require
189
deference to Executive or Legislative actions. Most relevant to our
claim under the ICCPR is the six-prong “political question” test
190
outlined in Baker v. Carr.
In Baker, the Supreme Court asserted
that although cases, which are barred from judicial decision because
they involve political questions vary, each case has “one or more
elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation
191
Under Baker, the Court asks if there exists: (1) “a
of powers.”
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department;” (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it;” (3) an “impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion;” (4) an “impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government;” (5) “an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;” or
(6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
192
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
Each

187. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1158-59 (6th ed. 1990). The political question
doctrine is inextricably linked to the separation of powers. See id. It is because of the
separation of powers that courts hold certain issues, which are committed to another
branch of government, to lie beyond the scope of judicial review.
188. See id. at 1365 (defining separation of powers doctrine to mean that the court
guards against the potential for one branch of government to encroach upon the
domain or to exercise the powers of another branch).
189. The political question doctrine has a long history in the United States’ legal
system. J. Peter Mulhern states that the doctrine originated in Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See J. Peter
Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 102 (1988).
Louis Henkin, however, analyzes whether a cohesive political question doctrine even
exists. See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600
(1976). Nonetheless, Henkin agrees with Mulhern that “Marshall was speaking of
such political questions as early as Marbury v. Madison.” Id. at 598 n.4. For a general
account of the main cases discussing the political question doctrine, see LAWRENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-13, at 98 (2d ed. 1988).
190. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
191. See id. at 217 (holding that a complaint alleging that a state statute effecting
an apportionment in violation of the 14th Amendment is a justiciable constitutional
cause of action, and did not present a nonjusticable political question). The Court
acknowledged, however, that there are several formulations and factors used in
determining the existence of a political question, but only when one of these
formulations is inextricably linked to the case itself will the court abstain from
hearing the case. See id.
192. See id. The Baker case did not generally involve a treaty. See id. Voters from
Tennessee brought an action to declare that the state’s apportionment statute
violated the equal protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at
187-88. The Court held that the action was justiciable and did not present a political
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of these factors will be addressed in turn.
The above factors are relevant to the present case involving the
ICCPR because in similar treaty cases involving political questions
courts have applied the Baker factors “to determine that provisions of
193
self-executing treaties are fully justiciable.”
It is important to remember that generally the court’s
interpretation of treaties, as the equivalent of federal statutes, falls
194
squarely within the role of the courts. The Court in Japan Whaling
195
Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society stated that “under the Constitution,
one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and
we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may
196
have significant political overtones.” The Second Circuit, however,
limited the application of the Baker test when it held that factors four
through six are only relevant if a judicial decision would contradict
197
prior decisions made by a political branch.
The Second Circuit
thought it best to use a case-by-case analysis to weigh the relevant
198
Any conflict between branches would need to
considerations.

question. See id. at 237. The Court discussed foreign relations and explained that it
is an error to assume that anything “touch[ing on] foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance.” Id. at 211.
193. Bederman, supra note 186, at 1483. The factors used by the Court in Baker
focus on whether self-executing treaties are justiciable. See id. These factors are
related to the discussion in Part II.B.3 of this Comment. This section discusses the
ways in which a defense under Article Six of the ICCPR is easily justiciable. Part
II.A.1 explains that the ICCPR is self-executing for the purpose of raising a defense
under the treaty.
194. See id. at 1460-61. Professor Bederman lists several questions that courts may
ask, and have traditionally asked, without abstention or deference to an executive
branch position. See id. at 1460. These questions include “1. whether the domestic
legal effect a particular treaty obligation was modified by reservation by the Senate;
2. whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing, and if non-self-executing;
whether a subsequent piece of legislation effectively implemented the agreement;
and 3. whether as a matter of law, a treaty provision has been superseded by a
subsequent statute (the ‘last in time’ doctrine).” Id. at 1460-61. The courts, however,
have deferred to the executive branch on the following issues: “1. whether a treaty is
invalid because our partner was incapable, by reason of the operation of the
domestic law of that nation, to enter into the agreement; and 2. whether a treaty is
terminated, suspended, or modified because of the breach of a treaty partner.” Id. at
1461.
195. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
196. Id. at 230.
197. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995). In this case, several
groups of victims from Bosnia-Herzegovina brought claims under the Alien Tort
Claims Act for violations of international law. See id. The court diverged from strict
interpretation of the political question doctrine in Tel-Oren and stated that it did not
view certain issues such as foreign relations categorically beyond judicial review. See
id. Likewise, the court said that it should not invoke the doctrine to avoid difficult
human rights issues. See id.
198. See id. at 249 (noting that even though the jurisdictional threshold may be
satisfied, the other consideration relevant to justiciablilty must be weighed before a
case can proceed).
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seriously interfere with important governmental interests before the
199
court could decline to hear the case.
The political question doctrine, as demonstrated by the courts’
200
limited application, is an exception to the courts’ responsibility to
decide cases or controversies that are properly brought before it. A
defense raised under the ICCPR does not fall into any of the factors
201
listed in Baker, and therefore, should not cause a court to abstain
from deciding this case. A defense under the ICCPR passes the first
202
Baker factor because the Constitution grants original jurisdiction to
203
The power
the federal courts to hear cases arising under treaties.
to decide claims arising under treaties is, therefore, not textually
204
committed to another branch of the government. A defense under
the treaty passes the second factor because, as the Second Circuit
205
decided in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, there are “universally recognized
norms of international law that provide judicially discoverable and
206
manageable standards for adjudicating suits.”
The defense passes
the third part of the Baker test because policy determinations from a
coordinate branch of the government are not necessary to decide this
207
case. The Executive branch’s explanations and Senate Committee
reports support a defense under the ICCPR as discussed in this
208
primer, and, therefore, the Court does not risk offending one of
the coordinate branches of government. Finally, a defense under this

199. See id. (stating that not every case dealing with foreign relations is
nonjusticiable).
200. See Bederman, supra note 186, at 1460-61 (explaining ways in which courts
have interpreted treaties and circumstances under which courts defer to executive
branch); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (suggesting a limitation in abstention based on
the political question doctrine).
201. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
202. See supra Part II.C.
203. See U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made . . . .”).
204. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (listing “textually demonstrable commitment” as
one of six factors).
205. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, citizens of the Republic of Paraguay
brought an action against another citizen of Paraguay for the wrongful death of their
son resulting from torture. See id. at 878. The court held that torture “violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights . . . .” Id. at 878.
206. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
207. See id. (explaining that claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act fell within the
jurisdiction of the judicial branch and the issue was “constitutionally committed” to
the court (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.
1991))). The court used its authority to hear cases arising under the Constitution as
evidence that the case passed the first three Baker factors. See generally discussion
supra Part II.C.
208. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19 (1992) (stating that “U.S. law generally
complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated.”);
see also discussion supra Part II (discussing raising a defense under ICCPR).
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209

treaty satisfies the fifth and sixth factors because this primer argues
that the political and executive branches intended for the courts to
recognize this defense and there is therefore no risk of multiple or
conflicting pronouncements on this issue by another governmental
210
branch.
B. Concerns of Federalism
The jurisdiction of the federal government’s treaty power is
211
sweeping and “states’ rights” place few limitations on this power.
The Constitution states that “[a]ll treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or Law of any State to the
212
Since the inception of the United
contrary notwithstanding.”
States, there has existed the idea that treaties are national acts that
213
operate “‘independent of the will and power’ of state legislatures.”
Professor Jordan Paust believes that the intent of the founders
indicates that treaties are meant to preempt and predominate over
214
state action.
Article 50 of the ICCPR states: “The provisions of the present
Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any
215
limitations or exceptions.”
Read literally, this provision of the
ICCPR indicates that regardless of reservations or declarations, states
must abide by the terms of the treaty. In addition, the non-self216
executing declaration only applies to Articles 1 through 27. Article

209. See id. (stating that factors four through six are only relevant if a court
decision would contradict a particular determination by a coordinate branch of the
government and that contradiction “would seriously interfere with important
government interests”).
210. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19 (“The intent is to clarify that the Covenant
will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts.”) (emphasis added). As
discussed in Part II of this Comment, a private right of action is not synonymous with
a defense, which is not barred under this treaty.
211. See Henkin, supra note 122, at 345-48 (stating that there is little that is not
within the jurisdiction of the United States’ treaty power).
212. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
213. Paust, supra note 74, at 761 (explaining the founders’ intent with respect to
the treaty power). Professor Paust argues that when John Jay was Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of the Confederation in 1787, he reported to Congress that a “treaty
‘made, ratified and published by Congress, . . . immediately [became] binding on the
whole nation, and superadded to the laws of the land . . . .’” Id. at 760. Paust posits
that Congress’ adoption of the report indicates an early expectation that treaties
should be self-executing. See id. at 761.
214. See id. at 764. Chief Justice Marshall affirmed this when he declared that both
state and federal judges are “bound by duty and oath” to apply treaty law. See id. at
765-66.
215. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 50, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185.
216. See STATUS REPORT, supra note 28, declaration (1), at 144.
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50 appears, therefore, to be self-executing and must apply to the
states.
217
Professor Paust also provides a similar interpretation when he
asserts that even if certain portions of human rights treaties are
legitimately non-self-executing, “the treaties should still trump
inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause of the United
218
States Constitution and the doctrine of federal preemption.”
His
argument draws strength from the Executive Explanation for the
ICCPR, which states that the Covenant will apply to state and local
219
authorities.
In a similar vein, the United States’ fifth understanding to the
ICCPR explains that the state governments “may take the appropriate
measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant” to the “extent that state
220
and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters.”
Professor Buergenthal’s interpretation based on the language of this
understanding suggests that state courts may apply the Covenant
221
directly to litigation that falls within the states’ jurisdiction. Under
this line of reasoning, if the state courts can properly adjudicate a
case under the treaty, and therefore recognize an individual right
and consider the treaty self-executing, the United States Supreme
Court can hear the case on appellate review without posing federalist
concerns to states’ rights.
CONCLUSION
Treaties are but one way to influence litigation in the United
222
States.
Treaties may be used to guide interpretations of existing
223
domestic legislation, or to assist courts in the application of

217. To the author’s knowledge, the interpretation of the treaty and the
Supremacy Clause discussed in the text appears to have originated with Professor
Paust.
218. Paust, supra note 19, at 323 n.108. Paust argues that under international law,
non-self-executing reservations and declarations that are inconsistent with the object
and purposes of the treaty are void and have no legal effect. See id. at 323. His
arguments regarding the application of treaties to the states, however, is valid even if
the non-self-executing declarations are otherwise valid and apply to the federal
government. See id.
219. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, supra note 29, at 18 (declaring that states “may
take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant”).
220. STATUS REPORT, supra note 28, Understanding (5), at 144.
221. See Buergenthal, supra note 72, at 222 (arguing that the treaty is selfexecuting for those provisions that involve matters that are within the jurisdiction of
the state courts).
222. See de la Vega, supra note 74, at 423 (listing three ways, in addition to treaties,
in which international human rights may be used in federal and state courts).
223. See id. For cases that have used treaties to aid in the interpretation of
domestic statutes, see, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.
243, 252 (1984) (applying the Warsaw Convention treaty in the absence of
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customary international law. This primer has discussed one method
for asserting a defense under the ICCPR. Arguments surrounding
customary law, though important, should bolster, and not subsume,
the role of treaties in upholding principles of international human
rights in domestic courts. Treaties may be directly applied only when
the United States has ratified them, and the ICCPR is one such treaty.
Customary law, on the other hand, by its nature, is not codified and,
therefore, is more difficult to enforce in domestic courts. This is not
to suggest, however, that advocates should shy away from using
customary international law in litigation. Instead, when the United
States is a party to a treaty, the advocate should begin by directly
applying the treaty to litigation and use customary law as further
support.
As a final conclusion, the advocate should: (1) argue that the
ICCPR is self-executing; (2) propose, in the absence of asserting that
the ICCPR is self-executing in its entirety, the treaty is self-executing
with respect to raising the treaty as a defense to executing juveniles;
(3) assert that a defense under the ICCPR is easily justiciable, even in
the absence of implementing legislation; (4) aver that the United
States’ reservation to Article Six of the ICCPR is invalid; and (5) claim
that recognition of a defense under the ICCPR does not threaten the
doctrines of federalism or the separation of powers.


Legislation); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (stating that the application of
a U.S. statute should not violate a treaty); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695
F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement to the U.S. Anti-terrorism Act).

